Leakage of Public Resources in the Health Sector: An Empirical Investigation of Chad by Bernard Gauthier & Waly Wane
 
Department of Economic Studies 
University of Naples “Parthenope” 










Title: Leakage of Public Resources in the Health   





Author:  * Bernard Gauthier, ** Waly Wane 
 
 




Affiliation:  * Institut d’Économie Appliquée, HEC 
                     Montréal 
                 ** Development Research Group, The   
                     World Bank 
 
 











   
 
Leakage of Public Resources in the Health Sector:  













In the public sector in developing countries, leakage of public resources could prove 
detrimental to users and affect the well-being of the population. In this paper, we 
empirically examine the importance of leakage of government resources in the 
health sector in Chad and its effects on medication mark-up. We make use of data 
collected in Chad as part of a Health Facilities Survey organized by the World Bank 
in 2004. The survey covers 281 primary health care centers and hospitals and 
contains information on the provision of medical material, financial resources and 
medication allocated by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the regional administration 
and primary health centers. While the regional administration is officially allocated 
60% of the MoH’s non-wage recurrent expenditures, the share of the resources that 
actually reach the regions is estimated to be 18%. The health centers, which are the 
frontline providers and the entry point for the population, receive less than 1% of the 
MoH’s non-wage recurrent expenditures. Accounting for the endogeneity of the level 
of competition among health centers, we observe that leakage of government 
resources has a significant and negative impact on the mark-up health centers 
charge patients on drugs sales. Furthermore, it is estimated that had public 
resources earmarked for frontline providers reached them in their entirety, the 
number of patients seeking primary health care in Chad would have more than 
doubled. 
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1   Introduction 
 
The importance of health for development provides a strong case for allocating 
public resources to the health sector. However, a growing body of research 
demonstrates that it cannot be taken for granted that allocating more budgetary 
resources to the sector will necessarily deliver better outcomes (Musgrove, 1996, 
Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; Filmer et al, 2000). Filmer et al (2000), for instance, find 
that health spending has, on average, no significant impact on the population’s 
health status in most of the studies they reviewed.1  
As noted by Ablo and Reinikka (1998), public health spending may have little 
impact on health status because health expenditures may not translate into 
improved services. Indeed, official health resources, as recorded in governments’ 
budgets, may not be adequate measures of resource availability especially in a weak 
institutional environment where mismanagement and corruption are serious issues. 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) find in their Uganda study significant gaps between 
primary schools’ official entitlements from a large public program and the amounts 
of resources the schools actually received. They attribute the gaps to capture and 
leakage of funds by the various layers of the political and administrative apparatus. 
In this paper, we estimate the extent of leakage of public spending in Chad’s 
health sector and empirically assess its impact on the delivery of health services. We 
try to identify the determinants of resource leakage, including characteristics of the 
public administration’s institutional structure and their impact on the level and 
prices of health services offered to the population. 
We make use of data collected as part of a Health Facilities Survey in Chad 
organized by the World Bank in 2004. The survey covered 281 primary health care 
centers and 30 hospitals in half the districts in the country, and contains 
information on resources and services as well as patients’ characteristics. The 
                                                 
1 Filmer et al 2000 (p. 204) noted that: “The cross-national evidence has always been absent or 
ambivalent on whether health status is improved by greater commitment to or greater spending on 
primary health care (or both).” Furthermore, the World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: 
Investing in Health notes that, controlling for the level of education at the cross-country level, there is 
no evidence that higher health spending leads to better health outcomes in terms of life expectancy or 
child mortality (pp. 53-54). 
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survey data include information on the central government budget, health centers’ 
monthly reports of activities, and the Ministry of Health’s (MoH) central store 
shipments to health centers. These data are used to keep track of the financial 
resources, medical material and main medication allocated by the MoH to health 
care providers. 
We seek to identify factors contributing to the inefficiency of public resource 
allocation and health service provision to the population. We examine the 
mechanisms of resource allocation through the public administration apparatus 
(central government, regional health administrations and local health centers) in 
order to identify sources of leakage. We then analyze the impact of resource 
dissipation on health services. We also examine the effect of leakage on the mark-up 
of medication sold to patients by health centers. 
The study shows that leakage is extensive at the central and regional levels of 
the health system, while local health providers receive a very small fraction of public 
resources originally intended for them. A central result of the paper is that public 
health spending has a strong positive and significant impact on service delivery once 
leakage of public resources is accounted for. As a matter of fact, we estimate that if 
all the intended public resources had reached the frontline providers, the number of 
patients seeking health care in Chad would have more than doubled. To explain this 
result we test whether drug prices could be the mechanism through which public 
resources receipt operates to increase demand. We show that in fact leakage has a 
significant impact on user fees because it increases the mark-up facilities charge on 
drugs, and thus directly impacts service accessibility and demand for health care. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the health sector in Chad. 
Section 3 presents the data from the health facility survey. Section 4 documents the 
importance of public resource leakage at the various levels of the health system. 
Section 5 presents econometric estimates of the determinants of resource allocation 
to health centers. It also assesses the impact of leakage on health services and on 





2    The Health Sector in Chad 
 
Chad is a Central African country with a population of 8.8 million individuals 
divided into approximately 12 ethnic groups. Its economy is based mainly on 
agriculture and cattle rearing. The primary sector accounts for 38% of GDP and 
employs about 80% of the labor force. Since independence in 1960, the country has 
experienced ongoing political instability that contributed to the 1979 civil war. In a 
referendum in 1996, Chad adopted a constitution that made the country a 
decentralized state. According to the Human Poverty Index, Chad is one of the 
poorest developing countries with US$304 GDP per capita, ranking 100th out of 103 
countries (UNDP, 2005). The adult illiteracy rate is 74.5%. Only 34% of the 
population has access to improved water and 8% to sanitary facilities. 
 
2.1   Health Indicators 
 
Health indicators in Chad are very mediocre and are even below what would be 
expected at the equivalent level of GDP (World Bank, 2002). Life expectancy at birth 
is 43.6 years and the child mortality rate (under 5 years) is 200 per 1,000 live births. 
Maternal mortality is among the highest in Africa, close to 1100 for 100,000 live 
births. The health problems affecting the population are mainly infectious diseases 
and parasites (malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infections). Outbreaks of meningitis 
and cholera are frequent in the country and cause many deaths among the poor and 
destitute. The incidence of these and other diseases has not improved during the last 
decade, despite significant increases in public resources officially allocated to the 
health sector. 
 
2.2   Health System 
 
The health system in Chad is organized as the pyramidal structure which is typical 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has four levels of responsibility. The MoH -the central 
level- is at the top of the pyramid and is in charge of formulating national health 
policies. At the second highest level one finds the 14 Regional Health Delegations  
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(RHDs) –the intermediary level- each headed by a regional delegate who is 
responsible for coordinating and implementing the strategy at the regional level. 
The regional delegate is also in charge for the management of the health personnel. 
The peripheral level is composed of 49 sanitary districts, each headed by a chief 
doctor, which are subsequently divided into 657 responsibility zones. The health 
infrastructure in a sanitary district should be composed at the minimum by a 
hospital (district level) and a network of health centers (zone level). However, in 
2001 only 407 responsibility zones had at least one functional health center (World 
Bank, 2004) and most could not provide all the services included in the minimum 
package of activities. 
There are currently three doctors, two midwives and 4 nurses per 100,000 
inhabitants, significantly below the WHO standard of 10 doctors, 20 midwives and 
20 nurses. The vast majority of formal health sector personnel are active in the 
public and non-profit sectors. The formal private for-profit sector employs less than 
1% of the health personnel (World Bank, 2004). With regard to drugs, a Central 
Pharmaceutical Procurement Agency (CPPA) was created in 1994 in N’djamena to 
improve the availability of drugs in the facilities across the country. To support the 
delivery system in the regions, 14 Prefectoral Purchasing Pharmacies (PPP) were 
also created. The CPPA was conceived as an autonomous entity which needed to be 
self-sustainable, hence user fees for drugs were also introduced. The CPPA has a 
monopoly over drugs and medical products sold to the PPP and to the public and 
non-profit health facilities. The drugs sector is regulated by the government and 
markup rates at each level of the supply chain are determined at the central level by 
the MoH. 
 
3    Data and Survey 
 
The primary data used in this paper come from the 2004 Quantitative Service 
Delivery Survey (QSDS) for which we drafted the survey instruments, organized the 
field work and monitored data collection for which a local firm was hired. 
The survey examined various levels of the health sector, collecting the most 
complete information possible on resource use, delivery processes, health output and  
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prices of health services. Data were collected between May 1 and July 16, 2004, 
using questionnaires administered to regional delegates, district chief doctors, 
regional pharmacy managers, heads of health facilities, health workers, and 
patients. 
The primary data has been supplemented by an impressive amount of secondary 
administrative data we collected directly from the MoH services. Data on facilities 
output such as the number of patients (in and out) by type of ailment, financial 
information such as user fees revenue and epidemiological information were 
collected from the Division of Sanitary Information. The Division of Financial 
Resources provided us with the budget of the MoH along with its breakdown by 
region and district.2 We also collected the logbook of materials sent to regions and 
districts for the year 2003 by the MoH’s central warehouse. This information comes 
with price data and thus allows a precise estimation of the value of all public 
material the center sent to its regional branches. Finally, we also collected data from 
the CPPA on the delivery of medical consumables to regions and health centers 
along with the purchases of the CPPA’s clients including the MoH for 2003.  
A key aspect of the survey is data triangulation whereby questions were included 
in the instruments to re-capture secondary data and assess the validity of the 
answers at the region, district, and facility levels. For instance, using the logbook of 
shipments of material from the MoH central warehouse to the regions or districts, 
eight materials have been randomly selected from the list of materials and included 
in the region, district, and facility questionnaires. The questionnaires ask for each of 
these items the quantity received and the date of reception. We then can compare 
the answers of the respondents to the data collected at the MoH. 
The main objective of the survey was to precisely measure leakage, if any, of 
public resources in the health sector. We will make precise the definition of leakage 
we use in the next section. However, a proper estimation of the leakage rate impacts 
the sampling strategy one can use. We used a two-stage sampling strategy for the 
QSDS. First, in each of the 14 delegations, either one or two districts, depending on 
the number of districts in the region, were selected at random. Second, in each of the 
                                                 
2 The district is the lowest level for which financial budget information is available. There is no 
resource earmarked for facilities and this will prove crucial for both the definition and estimation of 
leakage.  
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selected districts, we proceeded to a census of the health facilities which were all 
first identified and then visited.3 Given the importance of the capital, N’djamena, all 
its health centers were included in the sample. The original health center list was 
provided by the MoH Division of Sanitary Information and Statistics (DSIS). In 
addition, enumerators were instructed to identify and visit all health centers not on 
the initial list in a selected district, and especially the private clinics.  
The final sample is presented in Table 1. Of the 281 health centers making up 
the sample, approximately two-thirds are public, 14% are private, 16% are faith-
based and 3% are run by NGOs. About two-thirds of the health centers are located in 
rural area, less than one-quarter in the capital and 14% in other urban areas. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the Sample 
 Capital 
Other urban 
areas Rural Total 
Public   26  26  139  191 
Private 19  9  11  39 
Faith-based 4  2  39  44 
NGO  3 1 3 7 
Total  52 38  191  281 
 
 
In rural areas, public sector clinics account for approximately three-quarters of 
all health centers, compared with one-half in the capital. The private sector is 
mainly present in urban areas; approximately one-third of the capital’s health 
centers are privately owned, compared with one-quarter in other urban areas and 
only 6% in rural areas. Private clinics rank second in importance in urban areas, 
while faith-based clinics rank second in rural areas, accounting for one-fifth of 
health centers. Private clinics are absent in half of the country’s 14 regions. 
                                                 
3 One regional delegation (B.E.T.) was not included in the final sample because of security problems in 
the region at the time of the survey.  
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4  The Extent of Leakage in the Health Sector 
 
Leakage is usually defined as the proportion of resources intended for identified 
beneficiaries that does not reach them. The estimation of leakage rates then implies 
the ability to pin down exactly how much the intended beneficiaries received versus 
how much they should have received as given by resources earmarked4 for them. We 
use this definition to determine leakage at the regional and district levels. However, 
for individual health facilities, because no resources are earmarked for them, the 
estimation of leakage, in this sense, at the facility level is not feasible. We revert 
then to estimating the share of the health budget that does reach the primary care 
health facilities as a share of the total health budget earmarked for the regions. 
Because most of the public resources for health should end up in the facility, which 
is the service delivery point, this could be viewed as a broader concept of leakage. 
In this section, we assess the importance of leakage in the health center in Chad. 
We proceed in two steps. We first compare planned health expenditures at the 
central MoH level with those at the regional and district levels. We then estimate 
the amount of public resources that ultimately reaches primary health centers and 
potentially available to the population. 
 
4.1   Public Resources Reaching the Regional Level 
 
In 2003, the MoH budget was 33 billion CFA Francs (US$57 million). This 
represented 8.4% of the total government budget and an increase of 24% over the 
preceding year. Support from foreign donors in the form of grants and loans 
represented 48% of the total health budget. The share of recurrent and capital 
expenditures in the budget was 43% and 57% respectively. Personnel expenditures 
accounted for 16% of the total budget (37% of recurrent expenditures). Our analysis 
focuses on MoH recurrent expenditures. Despite their importance, capital 
                                                 
4 We will use the terms budgeted, earmarked, planned and official interchangeably throughout the 
paper.  
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expenditures are excluded from our analysis because of the absence of information 
concerning their execution.5 
In 2003, recurrent expenditures on health activities under the responsibility of 
the 14 regional health delegations (RHD) amounted to 8 billion CFAF. This 
corresponds to about 60% of the MoH recurrent budget (or two-thirds of the MoH 
non-wage recurrent budget). While the share of the MoH budget devoted to the 
regional level is significant, the vast majority of it (86%) is directly controlled by the 
MoH through so-called centralized credits. The remaining 14% of the regional health 
budget is managed at the regional level through decentralized credits. Table 2 
presents the health budget structure. 
 









  Decentralized 
share 
  Billions of CFAF    %    % 
Total  33.408          
Operations  13.407 8.030    59.9    14.3 
of which            
Personnel  5.295 2.560    48.4    100 
Materials  7.092 4.938    69.6     
Services  1.020 0.532    52.2     
            
Source: Revised Finance Law, Chad 2003 
 
The value of public resources arriving at the RHD level is therefore the sum of 
four components, namely (1) centralized credits, (2) decentralized credits, (3) ad hoc 
requests, and (4) drugs and vaccine delivery.  
(i)  Centralized Credits: These resources essentially consist of materials and 
medical consumables purchased by the MoH and destined for regional and 
district administrations and health centers. The official rationale for 
centralizing purchases is to benefit from economies of scale through public 
tendering procedures, combined with a lack of local capacity and suppliers. 
                                                 
5 Capital investments are mainly financed by foreign donors. Information on their execution is lacking 
because donors do not have common reporting procedures. Even so, based on information collected by 
the Financial Resources Directorate (FRD), in 2003, 32 public tendering procedures were officially 
proposed by the MoH, representing a value of 3.66 billion CFAF. However, only 7% of the investment 
budget had been officially accounted for at the end of the fiscal year and no contract had been yet 
executed.  
  9
There is no explicit allocation rule at the MoH level for allocating materials 
and medications to regions, districts and health centers. Allocations may 
reflect the preferences of the MoH, as well as specific demands by lower 
administrative levels.6 
(ii)  Decentralized Credits: These are budgetary resources given to regional or 
district administrations. Regional health delegates or district chief doctors 
are responsible for managing these financial resources, and for 
redistributing purchased materials and medications to health providers 
under their jurisdiction. 
(iii)  Ad hoc requests: Regional health delegates and district heads sometimes 
submit specific requests for (a list of) materials directly to the MoH. Once 
the request is granted and authorized, the regional delegates or district 
heads go to the central warehouse with their authorization letters and 
carry the material at their own expense to their regions or districts. 
(iv)  Drugs and vaccine deliveries: Drugs and vaccines destined for health 
centers and hospitals are purchased from a credit line managed by the 
MoH. In 2003, the drugs budget was 695 millions CFAF (US$1.4 million), 
or 12.7% of the RHD recurrent budget (excluding salaries).7 
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the value of the first three components of 
public resources (decentralized credits, centralized credits and ad hoc requests) 
actually received by the 14 RHDs during fiscal year 2003. The resources in question 
account for approximately 26.1% of the recurrent expenditures earmarked for the 
regions.8 To estimate the total value of public resources reaching the regional level, 
                                                 
6 All materials purchased with centralized credits to be sent to the regions originate from the central 
MoH warehouse in N’djamena. The destination points are the MoH warehouses in the regions and 
districts. All material exits are registered on exit slips by the central warehouse manager. When the 
material reaches the regional warehouse, the regional delegate verifies the list of material and certifies 
that the material has been received. He or she notes any missing material or potential quality problems 
with the material. 
7 Drugs and vaccines are formally included in the centralized credits, but follow a different path. Given 
that information on the MoH’s shipments of drugs was not available, we made use of data from the 
facility survey. 
8 Ad hoc deliveries were valued at 79.6 million FCAF in 2003, corresponding to just 1.3% of the non-
salary resources officially allocated to the RHDs. Materials sent to delegations were diversified and 
included ambulances, office desks, bleach, pens and paper. Material deliveries are estimated at 203 
million CFAF, less that 4% of the non-salary operating budget. With regard to ad hoc pick ups, there 
were some significant regional differences, with one of the 14 regions accounting for 72% of the total 
material value and certain regions located at some distance from the capital not receiving any  
  10
we add to these figures the value of drugs and vaccines received at the regional 
level.9 All the data has been triangulated to make sure of its validity.  
Figure 1 presents the actual allocation of public resources by region as a 
percentage of planned and executed expenditures. We observe that, on average, 
regional delegations received a total of 26.7% of their official non-wage budgetary 
expenditures from the MoH.10 The capital region (Chari-Baguirmi) exhibits the 
highest official expenditures, but also the third lowest resource arrival rate (19.6%) 
after the Batha (17.5%) and Salamat (15.7%) regions. The Mayyo-Kebbi region 


















































































Figure 1: Planned vs. Actual Allocations by Regional Health Delegations (RHD)  
 
Table A1 shows that decentralized credits account on average for more than 80% of 
total public resources received at the regional level. Most of the resources earmarked to 
the regions that are directly managed by the MoH do not ultimately reach the regional 
                                                                                                                                                 
materials. (For example, an ambulance had officially been allocated to a regional delegation whose 
head delegate reported only a motorcycle as a means of transportation at his delegation.) 
9 Because information concerning medications sent by the MoH to delegations was not directly 
available at the MoH level, it was collected in the survey of medications and vaccines received by health 
centers. It was then used to estimate the value of medications that had actually arrived at the regional 
level. Our hypothesis was that the share of each RHD in the medication budget equals their share in 
the total budget. 
10 When wages are included, the RHD received 50.1% of their official allocation.  
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level. This over-centralization of public resources appears to be a serious impediment for 
regions and health centers to receive their intended resources. 
 
4.2   Public Resources Reaching Health Centers 
 
Having estimated the public resources reaching the regional level, we now estimate 
the percentage that ultimately reaches local health providers. 
In Chad, health centers do not have specific budget lines in the national health 
budget. They are recipients of public resources only when higher administrative 
levels arbitrarily decide so. No administrative records are kept of resources sent to 
health centers. To estimate the value of resources reaching health centers, we use 
the survey data which include information on the financial resources received by 
health centers, as well as medical materials, medication and salaries.11 From the 
responses of the heads of health facilities in the survey, we estimate the value of 
medical material received by all the primary health care providers in the country to 
approximately 50 million CFAF,12 accounting for 17.7% of the total 282 million 
CFAF of materials received by all the regional delegations.13 O n l y  f o u r  h e a l t h  
centers (2%) report receiving financial resources from the health administration in 
2003.  
                                                 
11 Health centers report receiving no resources from regional delegations in the form of 
decentralized credits. 
12 The survey traced eight medical materials received by health centers. Health centers were 
questioned about the receipt of mattresses, beds, sheets, blankets, blouses for nurses and 
midwives, soap and detergent. The choice of these materials was based on their frequency in 
shipments. The risk of choosing a rare but high-value material would have been not finding 
that material in the visited health centers simply because not all of them were able to receive 
it.  On the contrary, by choosing frequently-shipped materials of small value, it is likely that 
a maximum number of health centers will report receiving them. This gives us an upwardly 
biased percentage of health centers receiving materials from the authorities. 
13 According to the survey, 57 health centers (30%) received at least one of these materials in 
2003 from the district or the delegation. The total value of materials is estimated at 
1,750,000 CFAF. Given that these eight materials make up 7.4% of the value of centralized 
credit deliveries, we can estimate that health centers receive approximately 23 million CFAF 
in centralized credits. Given that the survey covers half the health centers, the estimate 
would therefore be 50 million CFAF for the entire country.   
  12
Lastly, the total value of medication received by health centers is estimated at 
about 20 million CFAF14, accounting for less than 3% of the MOH official medication 
budget.15 
Table 3 and Figure 2 summarize official health expenditures at the central level 
and resources actually received at the regional and local levels (excluding and 
including salaries). The first column of Table 3 shows the resources officially 
allocated to RHDs in the national budget. The second column presents the estimated 
resources actually reaching the regional level, and the third column presents the 
estimated public resources reaching the health centers. While regional health 
delegations are officially allocated 67% of MoH non-wage recurrent expenditures, 
the share of resources actually reaching the regional delegations is estimated at 
18%. Leakage is also pronounced at the regional level, since the health centers, 
which are the frontline providers and the entry point for the population, ultimately 
receive less than 1% of MoH non-wage recurrent expenditures. 
Table 3: Arrival of Public Resources in RHDs and Health Centers 
 Resources 
Officially 
Allocated to RHDs 
Resources Actually 
Received by RHDs 
Resources Received 











Millions of CFAF    5,470  8,030  1,461  4,021  71.1  2,631 
% MoH non-wage 
recurrent budget 
67.4  18.0    0.9   
% MoH recurrent 
budget 
40.8  59.9 10.9  30.0  0.5  19.6 
                                                 
14 We estimate the value of deliveries to health centers by using the drugs prices charged by 
the CPPA. The total value of deliveries is estimated at about 5 million CFAF for the 11 drugs 
and medical consumables monitored in the survey. Based on the fact that these items 
accounted for 55% of CPPA sales in 2003, we can estimate the total value of drugs received 
by the health centers to be 9 million CFAF, and for the country as a whole, 20 million CFAF. 
15 The total value of resources reaching the health centers is the sum of the financial 
resources, medical materials, drugs and salaries received by health centers from the health 
administration. We use the formula Total resources reaching Health Centers = (Centralized 
credits reaching RHD and ad hoc orders)*17.7% + (Total Medication Budget)* 3% + Salaries. 
The formula hides regional disparities in arrival rates but health center data do not allow for 
capture of all the variance at the RHD level. The figure is biased upwards because the entire 
payroll of the delegations is allocated to the health centers. In reality, the salaries of 
administrative personnel in the regions and in the hospitals would have to be deducted.  
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Source: Revised Finance Law of 2003 and authors’ calculations 
As observed in Table 3, human resources are the most important resources to 
reach the health centers. Taking wages into account, the share of total resources 
officially allocated to RHDs and reaching health centers is 19.6% (See also Figure 
2)16. 

























Figure 2: Public Resources in the Health Sector by Levels 
Public resource arrival rates per capita vary considerably among regions. Table 4 
presents planned and actual per capita public expenditures on health by region. The 
official recurrent health expenditure per capita (excluding salaries) is 681 CFAF 
(US$1.17) in 2003. Of this amount, we estimate that only 181 CFAF (US$0.31) 
reaches the regional level, and health centers ultimately receive about 10 FCFA 
                                                 
16 As a referee rightly points out, this figure tends to overestimate resources available for 
direct services at the provider level given that it does not account for staff absenteeism. Data 
on absenteeism was collected part of the survey and was estimated at 21%. Using this figure, 
the share of total resources reaching frontline providers goes down to 15.6%. However, this 
correction most probably still overestimates total resources available for direct services given 
that the methodology used in the survey to measure absenteeism was not specifically 
designed for such purpose and probably underestimate the problem. Indeed, the survey was 
carried-out using announced visits in order to realize a multi purpose data collection at the 
facility level, while adequate measurement of absenteeism would need to be carried out in 
the framework of un-announced and repeated visits (see for instance Chaudhury et al 2006). 
  
  14
(US$0.02) per capita. The average Chadian loses 670 CFAF (US$1.15) between the 
health expenditure officially programmed in its region and the health resources 
actually available in the health center where he or she receives services.  
The highest rate of leakage is observed in the BET region, the most remote area 
of the country, where each individual loses an average of 1960 CFAF (US$3.92) in 
official public health expenditures. Despite having the highest rate of leakage, the 
BET region still receives the highest level of resources per capita due to its very 
small population. The region with the lowest level of effective health expenditure per 
capita is the Tangile region, with about 2 CFAF per capita. This is due to a low 
planned expenditure level and a high rate of leakage.17 
 



















  Excluding Salaries 
(CFAF per capita) 
Including Salaries 
(CFAF per capita) 
Batha 1046.78  188.87  12.95  1282.57  424.66  248.74 
B.E.T. 1989.69  595.73  38.02  2654.38  1260.53  702.82 
Biltine 851.55  282.88  19.20  1105.22  536.59  272.91 
Chari-Baguirmi 595.94  116.55  6.16  944.05  464.65  354.27 
Guéra 679.31  160.42  4.00  924.34  405.43  249.01 
Kanem 717.52  269.03  11.96  1591.94  1143.44  886.38 
Lac 650.15  234.30  10.93  808.84  392.96  169.59 
Logone 
Occidental  890.86 278.27  9.65  1368.20  755.61  486.99 
Logone Oriental  537.85  187.32  8.13  709.74  359.19  180.01 
Mayo Kebbi  476.66  206.48  15.43  738.07  467.89  276.85 
Moyen Chari  582.85  139.77  7.25  890.45  447.39  314.87 
Ouaiddaï 776.85  163.61  10.27  952.58  339.32  185.98 
Salamat 1338.09  210.55  13.03  1551.18  423.59  226.07 
Tandjilé 469.49  111.76  2.30  843.29  485.57  376.11 
CHAD 680.5  181.8 9.6  999.0 500.2  328.1 
                                                 
17 These estimates do not account for hospital expenditures, which tends to introduce a 
downward bias, especially in regions such as Chari Baguirmi, where the capital is located.  
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Source: Exit slips, MoH central warehouse, National budget 2003 and authors’ calculations. 
 
With regard to human resources, public expenditures reaching final users 
increase from 9 CFAF to 328 CFAF per capita, since these are the principal 
resources made available to health centers by the MoH (accounting for 32.8% of total 
health operating expenditures). 
 
4.3.   Primary Health Care Revenues 
The MoH budget officially allocates 60% of its recurrent budget to regional health 
delegations (67% of non wage recurrent budget). However, only 26.7% of this amount 
(excluding salaries) effectively reaches regional delegations. Furthermore, there 
exists a high level of retention of resources at the regional delegation and district 
levels. Ultimately, primary health centers do not have access to the public resources 
that were intended for them. Public resources reaching health centers are estimated 
at 1.3% and 0.9% of the regional delegations and MoH non-wage recurrent budgets 
respectively. These shares jump to 32.8% and 19.6% once wages are taken into 
account.18 
This considerable leakage reduces the contribution of public expenditures in the 
primary health sector in Chad with respect to what it should have been. Table 5 
presents the contributions of the various actors that finance primary care in Chad 
including donors and households or the communities who pay user fees. 
 
Table 5: Actual Contribution to Health Center Operations (%) 
  Public Private Faith-based  NGO   CHAD 
% of revenues 
(Excluding Salaries) 
User fees  88.4  96.6  90.3  78.5  89.7 
Donors 8.1  3.4  9.7  21.5  8.0 
Government 3.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3 
% of total revenues 
User fees  62.4  93.0  86.9  42.7  69.7 
                                                 
18 Accounting for absenteeism, these figures go down to 26.1% and 15.6%. See Footnote 16.  
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Donors 5.7  3.2  9.3  11.7  6.2 
Government 31.9  3.7  3.8  45.5  24.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Chad 2004 PETS/QSDS Survey 
 
Contrary to the conclusions of previous studies (Ministère de la Santé Publique 
2001, and World Bank 2004), we observe that user fess is the single most important 
source of financing for primary health centers. Government transfers account for 
only 2% of health centers’ revenues (excluding salaries) and for one-quarter of their 
revenues once salaries are included. Most public health expenditures are consumed 
by the central and regional administrations that do not provide direct services to the 
population. Once labor resources are allocated, health centers are left to their own 
devices to finance their activities through user fees. The impact in terms of access is 
significant, since the health centers will tend to charge higher user fees to make up 
for their lack of resources, as we will see in the next section.  
 
5   Econometric  Analysis 
 
In this section we examine the determinants of public resource allocation to regional 
delegations and local health centers and discuss the factors favoring leakage. We 
then examine the relationship between public expenditures and health services. In 
particular, we examine the link between health expenditures allocated to a region 
(or a district) and how they translate into health production. Finally, we examine 
the effects of leakage on service prices by looking at the prices of drugs sold by 
health centers.  
 
5.1   Determinants of Public Resource Received by the Health Centers 
 
Three main factors can be proposed to explain the low level of resources received at 
the decentralized level. First is the very high rate of resource centralization at the 
MoH level, second is the lack of supervision and control of resources, and third is the 
lack of planning in the allocation of resources. Allocations are arbitrary at every 
level. For example, once the delegated credits are allocated to regional 
administrators, they are entirely responsible for allocating those resources to the  
  17
various district heads or health centers in their area. The MoH does not provide any 
guidelines for resource allocation. In other words, a health center receives public 
resources only if the administrative authorities arbitrarily decide so. 
In order to examine the determinants of public resource receipt by health 
centers, we make use of a simple probit equation.  
) ( ) 1 Pr( 2 1
*
i i ij A µ α α + Χ + Φ = =  
where 
*
ij A  indicates whether or not health center i has received a strictly positive 
amount of public resource j (financing, drugs, material and total). Xi is a vector of 
health center and health administration characteristics and µi is an iid error term. 
In particular, Xi includes location, size in terms of number of employees, frequency of 
supervision visits by regional or district officials, and whether or not the center has 
received foreign donor support. The results are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Regression Results: Determinants of Public Resource Receipt  
by Health Centers (Probit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Public  1.055 [0.109] 1.019 [0.161]  1.202 [0.271]
  (2.84)*** (3.26)*** (4.47)***
Urban  0.099 [0.005] 0.233 [0.032] -0.111 [-
0.021] 
0.075 [0.021]
  (0.19) (0.76) (0.41) (0.31)






  (1.64) (1.17) (2.53)** (1.92)*
Supervision from region 
-0.394 [-
0.019]
0.311 [0.043] 0.615 [0.129]  0.372 [0.106]
  (0.8) (1.4) (3.01)*** (1.99)**
Supervision from district  -0.003 [0] 0.227 [0.027] 0.496 [0.084]  0.391 [0.1]
  (0.01) (0.72) (1.57) (1.47)







  (1.1) (3.32)*** (3.39)***
Constant  -2.138 -2.246 -1.77 -1.629
  (5.48)*** (3.97)*** (5.05)*** (4.89)***
Observations  155 277 277 277  
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Pseudo  R-squared  0.06 0.12 0.22 0.20 
Log Likelihood  –17.4  –80.13  –107.04  –128.5 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The first three columns concern specific resources (financing, drugs and 
material) while the fourth presents the probability that a health center has received 
any type of public support. 
As expected, public health centers receive significantly more resources than other 
facilities, while smaller clinics are more likely to receive public resources. Furthermore, 
the results show that the discretion of district and regional administrators has a significant 
impact on the probability of receiving public resources, in that the probability of 
receiving material resources increases significantly for health centers that have been 
visited by the regional delegate. This is also true for visits by the district head, but to a 
lesser extent. 
Transfers of financial resources (column 1) are not governed by the same rules as 
material resources (column 3), since virtually no health centers received any 
financial support and no variable is significant. An interesting result is the negative 
and significant impact of support by foreign donors on the receipt of public resources 
(columns 3 and 4). This tends to indicate that foreign donor support has a strong 
crowding out or displacement effect on public resources; the presence of donor 
support reduces the probability of receiving public medical materials by 13.6% and 
any type of public resources by 19.6%. 
 
5.2   Impacts of Public Resources on Health Service Production  
 
We now examine the link between government spending and services actually 
provided. Do public expenditures have an impact on output in the health sector, in 
terms of patients treated in health centers? Several studies have questioned this 
relationship (Filmer et al, 2000). An initial response is given by Figure 3, which 
shows the relationship between expenditures per capita (in CFAF) in a regional 
delegation and the number of patients visiting local health centers per 1,000  
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inhabitants in a region. We compare the effects of initially budgeted and executed 
health expenditures (3A) and actual or effective health expenditures (3B).19 
As shown in Figure 3(A), and contrary to World Bank (2004, figure 6.8 p. 133) 
results, public resources allocated to regional delegations (RHD) in the central 
budget appear to have a negative impact on health center output. Regions that were 
officially allocated the highest per-capita health expenditures present the lowest 
ratio of patients having received health services in the region. This result supports 
empirical observations of the weak correlation between official health expenditures 
and health indicators in several countries (see World Bank, 1993 and Filmer et al., 
2000). In certain cases, it has even been observed that an increase in health 
expenditures is associated with a decrease in health indicators.  
However, this negative conclusion does not hold once leakage of health 
expenditure is taken into account, and the reverse is actually true. Indeed, as 
illustrated in Figure 3(B) public expenditures do in fact have a strong positive 
impact on health output when they make it to the service delivery point. The main 
difference between Figures 3(A) and (B) is that in the second figure only effective 
public expenditures (that is, those that reach the regions) create this positive health 
impact. Public expenditures could therefore contribute to the improvement of the 
population’s health, provided they reach them. The tricky part is how to make sure 
that public resources actually reach their intended beneficiaries especially when it is 
the governmental apparatus itself that prevents those resources to travel their full 
path. 
 
                                                 
19 Regional production is the number of consulting declared by health centers reported in the “’Monthly 
Report of Activities” (RMA) sent to the MoH and consolidated by the DSIS. Figure 3 fits a simple 
regression line that does not control for all other variables that influence health production. Also as 
noted by a referee, BET, an apparent outlier, could be driving the relationships. Excluding BET, the 









Logone Occidental Logone Occidental Logone Occidental
Logone Oriental Logone Oriental Logone Oriental Logone Oriental
Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi








































500 1000 1500 2000








Logone Occidental Logone Occidental Logone Occidental
Logone Oriental Logone Oriental Logone Oriental Logone Oriental
Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi Mayo-Kebbi








































100 200 300 400 500 600
Effective per capita Allocation in FCFA
Initial/Effective Allocations and Performance
 
       ( A )              ( B )  
Figure 3: Operating Expenditures: Planned vs. Effective Resources and Performance 
 
Figure 3 does not control for variables other than public spending that could 
affect health production. We therefore examine the relationship between 
official/effective health resources and health services through a more comprehensive 
regression analysis. We estimate the following equation:  
l l l C ε β β + Υ + = 2 1  
Where  Cl is the number of patient consultations taking place annually in a 
region or a district l, Yl is a vector of region or district characteristics, and εl is an iid 
error term. In particular, Yl includes either planned or actual non-wage recurrent 
health expenditures in the region or district, the number of health centers and 
districts, the population served, the total revenues from user fess of health centers, 
and salaries. Table A2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of variables. 
Table A2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of variables. 
Table 7 shows the regression results for the total number of consultations in the 
health centers of a region (columns 1-6) or a district (columns 7-8).   
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Table 7: Regression of Total Consultations and Health Expenditures  
(Budgeted and Effective) 
 Regions  Districts 
  Budgeted Public expenditures    Effective Public Expenditures     
  (1)  (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Budgeted 
Expenditure 
–125.4 87.182  195.72           
  (0.31) (0.16)  (1.13)           
Effective 
Expenditures 
      1842.50  1867.08  693.716 1185.21 851.598 
       (2.99)*  (3.06)*  (2.43)* (3.05)**  (2.51)* 
Nbr of Health 
Centers (1000) 
1.5 3.7 –3.7  0.6  1.5  –4.3  1696.23  1156.66 
  (0.43) (0.74)  (1.98)  (0.28)  (0.68) (3.68)** (2.57)*  –2.01 
Total 
Population 
0.17 –0.001  0.078  –0.091 –0.068  0.166  0.15  0.107 
  (0.4) (0.002)  (0.47)  (0.6)  (0.45) (2.49)* (2.32)*  (1.92) 
Total 
Revenues 
   1204.98      990.088   491.594 
     (8.39)**      (6.98)**   (4.15)** 
Nbr of districts 
(1000) 
35.6 39.0  28.9  50.1  50.1  32.6     
  (0.83) (0.88)  (2.01)  (1.68)  (1.7)  (2.80)*     
Total salaries   -285.001 324.518    –265.612  299.158     
   (0.63)  (1.99)    (1.11) (2.46)*     
Observations  14 14  14  14  14  14  46  46 
Adj. R-squared  0.69 0.67  0.96  0.84  0.85  0.98  0.57  0.69 
Prob > F  0.0044  0.012  0.0000  0.0002  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
At the district level, resources effectively received are delegated credit resources. 
The coefficients associated with the number of health centers and districts have been divided by 1000. 
The total population is that of the district or the region depending on the model considered. Similarly 
with total salaries and revenues. Revenues are those reported by health centers. 
 
Official public resources allocated to regions are used as an explanatory variable 
in the first three regressions, and public resources actually received are used in the 
others. As observed, official health expenditures do not explain health output at the 
regional level (columns 1-3). The coefficient of official expenditures is not significant 
in the first three regressions (and is even negative in the first case). Only the third  
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regression includes a significant variable, the total revenues of health centers in a 
region. This suggests that only user fees are correlated with regional health output, 
a result one should expect.20  
Let us turn next to effective health expenditures as a determinant of health 
output at the regional (equations 4-6) and district levels (equations 7-8). In all five 
regressions, the coefficients of effective health expenditure are positive and strongly 
significant. This suggests that public expenditures have a positive impact on health 
output at the regional and district levels. Indeed, for a million CFAF (US$1720) of 
effective public expenditures received in a region, 693 more patients would receive 
medical consultations in primary health centers in the region (see column 6).  
As previously shown (Table 3), approximately 4 billion CFAF officially budgeted 
for regional delegations do not reach the regional level. Using the Model 6 coefficient 
of effective health expenditures, we can estimate that close to 3 million patients do 
not visit health centers because public resources do not reach service providers. 
Given that primary health centers in Chad have treated about 2.5 million patients 
in 2003, this provides a much better grasp of the impact of public resource leakage 
on health services in Chad; if all public resources had reached the frontline 
providers, the number of patients seeking primary health care in Chad would have 
more than doubled. 
 
5.3   Leakage of Resources and Mark-up 
 
One possible mechanism by which actual receipt of public resources would allow 
better access to health services is through the reduction of user fees, in particular 
drugs prices. Several empirical studies have shown that drugs costs constitute an 
important barrier to health service access. The population often does not go to health 
centers because they believe their resources will be insufficient to cover the total cost 
of the medical visit and prescribed drugs. In Chad, drugs account for roughly 75% of 
total medical costs for patients, and as much as 85% in rural areas. In this section, 
we examine the importance of leakage on the average mark-up charged by health 
centers on the price of medication, one of the main components of user fees. 
                                                 
20 There is no regression with “budgeted” expenditures for districts because the regions do not prepare 
budgets for their districts.  
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Most health centers have a pharmacy that sells drugs to patients. The survey 
collected information on 11 of the main drugs allocated by the MoH to intermediate 
levels and primary health centers, as well as information on drugs purchase prices at 
regional pharmacies and sale prices to patients. 
Using this information, a simple average mark-up on drugs charged by health 
centers (i.e. the difference between purchase and sale prices) was calculated. The 
results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
Table 8: Average Mark-up on Drugs by Facility Type (in CFA Francs) 
 N  Mean  Median  Minimum    Maximum 
          
Public 180  42.3  36.4  –655.7 244.3 
Private 26  87.1  84.7  –32.9 301.7 
Faith-based 38  73.0 53.4 –51.5  343.9 
NGOs 5  92.4  44.3  0  217.3 
Total  249 52.5  41.7  –655.7  343.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Chad 2004 PETS/QSDS Survey 
 
Table 9: Average Mark-up by Facility Location (in CFA Francs) 
 Mean  Median 
Number of 
Health Centers 
      
Rural 48.9  38.9  180 
Other urban areas  41.4  34.1  34 
Capital 81.5  64.4 35 
Total  52.5 41.7  249 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Chad 2004 PETS/QSDS Survey 
 
As observed in Table 8, the average mark-up on drugs sold by the 249 health 
centers that provided information is 52.5 CFAF (median 41.7 CFAF). Public 
facilities charge a much smaller mark-up, less than half that of private providers. 
NGOs and faith-based providers also charge higher mark-ups than public facilities. 
In the capital, mark-up is close to double that generally observed in rural areas,  
  24




5.4   Effects of Public Resource Leakage on Medication Mark-up 
 
We have estimated the effect of public resource leakage on the mark-up charged by 
primary health centers. Table 10 presents regression results for the effect of public 
expenditures on drug mark-ups using OLS (columns 1 to 4). Because the bulk of the 
resources are sent to the regions which decide how to allocate them among health 
centers, the standard errors are clustered at the regional level to account for within-
region correlation. 
Our main variable of interest is a dummy indicating whether the health center 
was a recipient of public resources. We also include a set of facility characteristics, 
such as ownership status, location, the level of competition proxied by the number of 
health centers in a two-kilometer radius of the center, and salary levels. To reflect 
service quality, we also include the number of doctors in the facility, the number of 
beds, the availability of electricity and telephone, and if it offers housing to its 
personnel. We have also accounted for donor support.  
One econometric issue that arises is that the level of competition among health 
service providers is unlikely to be exogenous; in fact, certain types of health centers 
are more likely to be located in certain areas. In particular, private health centers 
are more likely to be located in urban areas and faith-based centers in rural areas. 
In order to obtain consistent estimates, we have estimated the determinants of 
mark-up and competition using the two-stage-least-square method (columns 5-6). 
Results for all the regressions show that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between average mark-up on drugs and effective transfers of public 
resources to health centers. Local health facilities that receive government transfers 
are able to charge lower mark-ups on medications than centers that do not receive 
transfers. Leakage of government resources thus appears to have a significant and 
negative effect on user fees and to constitute a barrier to health service access. It is  
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difficult with our data to figure out the reason why public resources translate into 
lower drugs prices and there may be several competing explanations. 
The coefficient on competition does not have the expected sign since facilities 
that face greater competition seem to charge significantly higher mark-up. This may 
be explained by the fact that facilities that have more competitors are more likely to 
be private. Furthermore, we also observe that health centers located in rural areas 
tend to charge significantly lower mark-up than centers located in urban areas 
(omitted variable). Furthermore, the presence of doctors and of a mean of 
transportation in the health centers, are associated with higher mark-up, due 
potentially to higher costs. Access to a telephone is associated with lower mark-up, 
due potentially to better information. 
For robustness purposes, similar regressions were run on the effect of effective 





Table 10: Regression Results: Mark-up and Receipt of Public Resources 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS 
  Mark-up Mark-up  Mark-up  Mark-up  Mark-up Competition 
Received public  –27.909  –23.321  –21.975  –15.883  -21.996   
Resources  (2.96)** (2.45)**  (2.36)**  (2.50)**  (1.92)*   
Private   30.881  20.575  14.673  17.344  0.401 
   (2.02)**  (2.53)**  (1.89)*  (0.83)  (2.30)** 
Competition     9.722  13.442  2.199   
     (3.17)***  (2.42)**  (0.08)  
Rural       9.32  3.263   
      (0.52)  (0.09)  
Total salaries        0.003  -0.008   
      (0.35)  (0.56)  
Doctor       19.616  19.910   
      (5.69)***  (1.99)**   
Telephone       –39.566  -57.427   
      (2.69)**  (2.23)**   
Electricity       17.721  14.307   
      (1.68)  (0.77)  
Transportation       13.786  37.112   
      (1.31)  (3.09)***   
Housing       12.189  13.582   
      (0.92)  (1.17)  
Number of beds        –0.502  -0.630   
      (2.73)**  (1.22)  
Donor support Nbr      8.532  -3.290   
      (1.15)  (0.30)  
Capital          2.10 
          (13.21)*** 
Other urban areas          0.962 
          (6.31)*** 
NGO          0.145 
          (0.33) 
Faith-based          -0.051 
          (0.37) 
Donor support            -0.05 
           (0.39) 
Age          0.007 
          (2.16)** 
Constant 60.76  56.179  51.155  23.906  83.350  0.031 
 (6.24)***  (6.77)***  (6.71)***  (2.42)**  (1.55)  (0.35) 
Observations   249 249  249  249  233  233 
R-squared  0.03 0.04  0.06  0.12  0.24  0.52 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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6   Conclusion 
 
In 2003, the budget of the Chad Ministry of Health accounted for 8.4% of the total 
government budget, an increase of 24% over the previous year. The MoH allocates 
close to 60% of its recurrent budget to the regional delegations. Because of excessive 
centralization and major leakage of resources, the majority of this budget does not 
reach the regions. Regional delegations receive about 26% of the material and 
financial resources that were officially allocated to them, while the regional and 
district administration capture most of the resources allocated. Ultimately, local 
health centers receive less than 1% of the MoH non-wage recurrent budget officially 
allocated to the regions. The official health budget therefore bears no relation to the 
actual situation on the ground. Although the government officially allocates 680 
CFAF (US$1.17) in health expenditures for the average Chadian, that person 
actually receives less than 10 CFAF (US$0.02). 
The problem of service quality leads us to a fundamental question concerning 
poverty reduction: how do we ensure that the targeted recipients actually benefit 
from the resources? The main recommendations in this respect support the 
importance of an incentive system that would reward performance, as well as the 
importance of information systems and verification systems, the need to monitor 
resources to ensure that they reach their destination, and the introduction of 
allocation rules that would make allocation decisions more transparent. These 
elements are currently missing from the flow of resources in Chad’s health system. 
We have shown that current resource allocation seems to be linked to the 
discretion of regional and district administrators, and that international donor 
support introduces a strong crowding out effect, whereby health centers that 
received foreign assistance are less likely to be supported by higher administrative 
levels. 
Also, we have shown that, contrary to pessimistic views, health expenditures do 
in fact have a positive impact on health services. While official expenditures 
seemingly have no impact on health output at the regional level, public expenditures 
that actually reach health centers do have a strong positive and significant impact 
on the number of ill individuals who seek care. We estimated that if all expenditures  
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officially targeted to regions had actually reached the health centers, the number of 
patients treated would have more than doubled.  
One mechanism by which health expenditures could have an effect is through 
user fees. We examined the effect on medication prices and showed that leakage has 
a negative and significant impact on the prices of medications sold by health centers. 
Health centers that do not receive public support tend to charge significantly higher 
mark-ups on medications than centers that receive public resources. 
Since the beginning of the new initiative in the context of petroleum production, 
health expenditures and expenditures in other social sectors have increased but 
without noticeable impacts on social indicators. The low percentage of public 
resources actually received at the operational level could certainly explain a large 
part of this phenomenon. Given that the country’s health policy is based on districts, 
administrative levels and health center services, and given the absence of resources 
for them to function normally, it is the entire strategy that is called into question.  
Although this study focuses on the health sector, its conclusions regarding the 
problems of delivering public resources probably also concern other sectors, such as 
education, agriculture and public works. A major reform of the public management 
and public expenditure system is required in order for service facilities and the 
population in general to benefit from the public resources allocated in the national 
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Table A1: Public Resources Reaching Regional Health Delegations 
(in Million CFAF) 
   Financial 
Resources   Material Resources   
   Delegated 





Requests   
Total 
Regional Delegation          
Batha    51.08 16.08  0.10  67.26 
B.E.T.    39.79 12.42  2.45  54.66 
Biltine    45.72 18.64  1.32  65.69 
Chari-Baguirmi    151.77 22.06  7.06  180.89 
Guéra    59.78 0.00  1.47  61.25 
Kanem    77.82 17.70  0.00  95.52 
Lac    60.48 14.08  0.00  74.56 
Logone Occidental    141.76 17.05  0.24  159.05 
Logone Oriental    86.46 17.05  0.38  103.89 
Mayo Kebbi    137.29 20.19  57.52  215.00 
Moyen Chari    105.42 23.34  0.00  128.76 
Ouaiddaï    85.33 24.76  0.49  110.58 
Salamat    39.19 0.00  8.56  47.75 
Tandjilé    63.26 0.00  0.00  63.26 
TOTAL    1145.15 203.38  79.60 1428.13 
% Operation RHD    14.3 2.5  1.0  17.8 
% RHD (Excl Sal.)    20.9 3.7  1.5  26.1 
% Operation MoH    8.5 1.5  0.6  10.7 






Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N  Mean  S.D.  Min  Mdn  Max 
            
Regions            
Nbr of Consultations  14 129.5  108.9 17.3 93.6  363.6 
Official Expenditures  14 390.7 208.74  186.4  309.76  955.02 
Effective Expenditures  14 104.36  52.66 49.7 86.13  218.1 
Nbr of Health Centers   14 46.79  27.43  13  45  106 
Total Population  14 560.16 390.88 91.4  466.65  1563.46 
Total Revenues  14 113.92  105.4 7.48 88.36  361.54 
Number of districts   14  3.43  1.55  2 3 7 
Total salaries  14 182.86  146.9 50.3 109.7  557.86 
Districts         
Nbr of Consultations  52 51.3  37.0 5.7 41.5  167.6 
Effective Expenditures  46 14.28  11.02 4.26  11.38  66.16 
Nbr of Health Centers  48 13.65  7.25  1  11  38 
Total Population  50 156.84  68.49 34.61 152 347.32 
Total Revenues  52 30.67  30.69  0  19.21  120.38 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Chad 2004 PETS/QSDS Survey.  
Note: Number of consultations and total population are in thousand. Expenditures, total revenues and total 
salaries are in million CFA francs. 
Variable N  Mean  S.D.  Min  Mdn  Max 
         
Health Centers 













Private  281 0.32 0.47  0  0  1 
Competition  281 1.22 1.89  0  0  10 
Rural  281 0.68 0.47  0  1  1 
Total salaries  281 339.23  448.99  0  183  3779 
Doctor  281 0.23 0.78  0  0  6 
Telephone  281 0.14 0.35  0  0  1 
Electricity  281 0.34 0.47  0  0  1 
Transportation  281 0.52  0.5  0  1  1 
Housing  281 0.37 0.48  0  0  1 
Number of beds  281 2.88 9.59  0  0  134 
Donor support Number  281 0.21 0.46  0  0  2 
Capital  281 0.19 0.39  0  0  1 
Other urban areas  281 0.14 0.34  0  0  1 
NGO  281 0.02 0.16  0  0  1 
Faith-based  281 0.16 0.36  0  0  1 
Donor support  281 0.19 0.39  0  0  1 
Age of clinic  261 16.3 15.1  0  10  69 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Chad 2004 PETS/QSDS Survey 
Note: Salaries are in thousands of CFA francs and on a monthly basis. 
 